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Abstract
Regulatory compliance is often promoted via unannounced inspections where firms
found to be in violation of environmental, health, or safety regulations face punish-
ments. When compliance is costly to firms, a key aspect of this approach is that the
timing of inspections is unannounced and difficult to anticipate, lest firms comply only
when they believe an inspection is likely. With data from Los Angeles (LA) County
food-service health inspections, I estimate how the (in)ability to anticipate inspection
timing affects compliance using a novel approach. Many facilities such as hotels, gro-
cery stores, or food courts, consist of multiple food-service establishments sharing a
single physical location. Multiple establishments within a single facility are commonly,
though not always, inspected on the same day, meaning all but one of the establish-
ments involved likely anticipate the timing of their next inspection to a considerable
extent. Within such facilities, I show that establishments perform significantly worse
on days in which they receive the sole inspection conducted at their facility. These
“surprise” inspections detect 7.75% more violations, 9.1% more inspection score point
deductions, and 16.3% more major critical violations (the most severe violations of the
county health code).
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1 Introduction
Enforcement of environmental, health, and safety regulations often involves periodic
unannounced inspections of firms, during which, detected violations incur punishments. In-
spection regimes promote compliance by establishing, at all times, an expected cost for
committing violations: the cost incurred if the violation is detected multiplied by the proba-
bility of inspection and subsequent detection. However, if firms can anticipate the timing of
inspections to some extent (i.e., correctly predict when their inspection probability is low),
much of this expected cost may be mitigated.
Regulatory agencies face a tradeoff: limiting firms’ abilities to anticipate inspection tim-
ing (e.g., by increasing inspection frequency) should improve compliance, but is costly. This
makes it important to understand how, and to what extent, the ability to anticipate inspec-
tion timing affects compliance.
Accounting for firms’ abilities to anticipate inspection timing severely complicates em-
pirical assessment of this relationship. The most closely related existing studies employ a
two-step approach. First, inspection probabilities for different time periods are estimated
using firm observables. Then, compliance measures are estimated as a function of the prob-
ability predictions, which proxy for firms’ expected inspection probabilities.1 Alternatively,
I exploit a feature of Los Angeles (LA) County food-service health inspections that provides
sharp within-firm variation in the ability to anticipate inspection timing.
The LA County Department of Public Health (DPH) conducts regular unannounced
food-service health inspections. Many LA County facilities (e.g., hotels, grocery stores, food
courts) house multiple separate food-service establishments. Within such facilities, multiple
establishments are sometimes inspected on the same day. When this occurs, the first estab-
lishment inspected may be the only one to truly receive a “surprise inspection”. The other
establishments, if aware of the inspector’s presence, have considerable ability to anticipate
1Using this approach, Gray and Deily (1996), Eckert (2004), and Telle (2009) find positive relation-
ships between inspection probability estimates and environmental regulatory compliance among Canadian
petroleum storage sites, US steel producers, and Norwegian plants, respectively.
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the timing of their next inspection.
Using data from 9,545 inspections spanning October 2015 through March 2018, I find
that within multiple-establishment facilities, individual establishments perform significantly
worse on days when they receive their facility’s only inspection. Specifically, 7.75% more
violations and 16.27% more major critical violations (the most severe LA County health code
violations) are detected compared to days when they receive one of multiple inspections at
their facility. This suggests that these establishments exhibit lower compliance levels than
is often detected due to their ability to anticipate inspection timing; and that if the practice
of multiple same-day inspections were abandoned, their compliance levels would improve.2
These results add to a relatively small body of evidence regarding regulatory compliance
and the surprise nature of inspections. To my knowledge they are the first such results that,
rather than proxying for firm beliefs with inspection probability estimates, utilize two differ-
ent inspection states across which ability to anticipate inspection timing varies considerably
within firms. Finally, they highlight a dilemma likely faced by many authorities regulat-
ing food-service hygiene. Facilities housing multiple food-service establishments are very
common, and it’s less costly to inspect these establishments by sending an inspector to the
location once. Are the additional costs of inspecting separate establishments during separate
visits outweighed by the potential public health benefits?3 My results enable evaluation of
this tradeoff, and follow a methodology by which regulatory bodies across the industry can
make similar assessments.
2These establishments presently receive a mix of surprise and non-surprise inspections. Going forward,
if establishments wish to at least maintain their average performance from the mixed period, a policy of
surprise inspections only would require compliance improvements.
3The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated in 2011 that about 1 in 6 Americans contract
foodborne illness annually (see http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html). They also es-
timated that, in 2013, restaurants accounted for 60 percent of US foodborne illness outbreaks with a single
known food-preparation source (see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2013)).
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2 Los Angeles County Food-Service Health Inspections
The LA County DPH inspects all restaurants and retail food markets in unincorporated
areas, and 85 of the 88 municipalities in the county.4 Establishments are categorized as low,
moderate, or high risk, based on the nature of the food served.5 Establishments are inspected
1 to 3 times annually, and inspection frequency is higher for establishments in higher risk
categories.
Establishments receive inspection scores beginning at 100, and points are deducted for
health code violations. Violations are classified as critical or non-critical. Non-critical viola-
tions carry 1-point deductions. Critical violations are further classified as minor or major,
carrying 2-point and 4-point penalties respectively.6 The scoring criteria were revised be-
ginning January 1, 2017. Three major critical violations now carry 11 rather than 4-point
deductions. Also, committing two or more of the other major critical violations incurs an ad-
ditional 3-point deduction.7 In estimation, I account for the possible effects of these changes
on compliance.
Detected violations are costly to establishments, in part, due to a disclosure program.
Excluding seven municipalities, establishments are required to display letter-grade placards
for their most recent inspection score in their window.8 Inspection data are shared with
Yelp.com, and since 2014, Yelp posts letter grades on the profile pages of all establishments,
even those in municipalities not requiring grade-card posting.
4Pasadena, Long Beach, and Vernon have their own health departments.
5For example, drug stores that sell pre-packaged food and drinks are categorized as low risk, whereas
sushi restaurants are categorized as high risk.
6There are eleven critical violations that may be classified as minor or major based on the observed
infraction’s severity.
7The 3-point penalty is not added in inspections where an 11-point deduction is incurred.
8Above 89 receives an A; 80 to 89, a B ; 70 to 79, a C ; and numeric scores are posted when below 70.
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3 Data and Estimation Sample
The data come from County of Los Angeles Open Data (2018), and span October 1, 2015
through March 31, 2018. Observations correspond to violations and indicate the health code
violated and resulting point deduction.9 The inspection date, final inspection score, and
identifiers for the establishment, establishment owner, establishment facility, and inspector
that conducted the inspection, are also included.
The data contain 190,163 inspections of 47,487 establishments located at 44,104 facili-
ties. There are 4,852 establishments located at one of 1,469 multiple-establishment facilities.
Among multiple-establishment facilities, there are 1,913 establishments that: (1) at least
once received their facility’s sole inspection that day, and (2) at least once received one of
multiple inspections at their facility that day. These establishments’ 9,545 inspections form
my estimation sample.
4 Methodology
To estimate how the ability to anticipate inspection timing affects compliance, I compare
establishment performance across two inspection states: days where they received their
facility’s sole inspection, and days where they received one of multiple inspections at their
facility. Using all 190,163 inspections, Figure 1 compares scores across both inspection states,
revealing that establishments perform much better in the latter.10 However, these simple
comparisons pose a problem: at single-establishment facilities, establishments always receive
their facility’s sole inspection, and the choice to locate at multiple-establishment facilities
may correlate with unobservable features that affect compliance.
To remove this potential source of bias, I focus on multiple-establishment facilities only.
9These entries are empty for 100-point scores.
10All scores are measured under the pre-2017 scoring criteria. Scores from 2017 and 2018 were adjusted
when appropriate.
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Estimating equations take the form
Yi,j,t = α1Solei,j,t +Xi,j,t
′
α+ ai + i,j,t, (1)
where Yi,j,t is an inspection outcome (e.g., total violations). Solei,j,t equals 1 if, on date t,
establishment i receives the sole inspection at facility j, and equals 0 otherwise.
I restrict my estimation sample to the 1,913 establishments with at least one inspection
where Solei,j,t = 1, and at least one inspection where Solei,j,t = 0, and include establishment
fixed effects. This compares the performance of establishments when Solei,j,t = 1 against
their own performance when Solei,j,t = 0. Estimates of α1 provide a lower bound on, e.g.,
average violations per inspection that go undetected when ability to anticipate inspection
is elevated. It is a lower bound because, even on days when multiple establishments at a
facility are inspected, the first establishment inspected lacks an elevated ability to anticipate
inspection timing.11
5 Results
Table 1 presents estimates of equation (1) where the only controls are establishment fixed
effects and an indicator variable equal to 1 if an inspection occurred after 2016 (when the
scoring criteria changed). Standard errors are clustered two-way, following Cameron et al.
(2011), at the facility and inspector levels.
This simple specification is applied to four inspection outcomes: total violations, total
critical violations, total major critical violations, and deducted points.12 Table 2 presents es-
timates with additional controls for the inspection’s day of the week, month, and year.13 Un-
der both specifications, receiving a facility’s sole inspection leads to significant and substan-
tial increases in all outcomes. Within this sample, when receiving one of multiple inspections
11On a single day, the ordering of inspections within a facility is unknown.
12For consistency, scores are measured under the county’s original criteria across the entire sample period.
13Inspector fixed effects are nearly perfectly colinear with establishment fixed effects, and thus, excluded.
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at their facility, establishments average: 3.5941 violations, 0.7614 critical violations, 0.1715
major violations, and 4.6985 deducted points. Relative to those averages, full-specification
estimates suggest that reduced ability to anticipate inspection timing leads to detection of:
7.75% more violations, 12.24% more critical violations, 16.27% more major critical viola-
tions, and 9.10% more point deductions.
Recall that establishments are assigned to three risk categories based on the type of food
served (not inspection histories), and establishments in higher risk categories are inspected
at higher frequencies.14 Of the 1,402 facilities in the estimation sample, 962 house estab-
lishments in at least two different risk categories. Thus, most of the variation in Sole is
likely driven by the need to inspect different risk-level establishments at different frequen-
cies. However, it could be problematic if Solei,j,t is influenced by an establishment’s recent
inspection history. For instance, if sole inspections tend to follow worse-than-usual inspec-
tions, αˆ1 might partly reflect establishments’ persistent declines in hygiene quality. Table
3 alleviates these concerns, showing that my results are robust to including establishments’
lagged deducted points as a regressor.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that regulatory compliance is quite sensitive to the ability to antici-
pate inspection timing. Establishments that are often able to anticipate inspection timing
are found to be significantly less compliant when that ability is occasionally removed. If
establishments desire the inspection outcomes they receive when able to anticipate inspec-
tion timing, then permanent removal of this ability would cause compliance improvements.
This demonstrates a dilemma likely faced by many regulatory bodies: conducting same-day
inspections of establishments at a shared facility is less costly, but reduces compliance among
these establishments. In LA County, this reduced compliance includes the commission of
significantly more major critical violations, suggesting potential public health benefits that
14Risk category is time-invariant and absorbed in the establishment fixed effects.
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may exceed the cost of inspecting separate establishments at such facilities on separate days.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Inspection Scores at All Facilities
Navy dots mark the relative frequency of scores among 173,181 inspections on days where estab-
lishments received their facility’s only inspection. Red diamonds mark the relative frequency of
scores among 16,982 inspections on days where establishments received one of multiple inspections
at their facility. All scores are meaured under the pre-2017 scoring criteria.
Table 1: The Effect of Surprise Inspections on Performance: Simple Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Critical Major Critical
Variable Violations Violations Violations Deducted Points†
Sole 0.2380*** 0.0714** 0.0271** 0.3636***
(0.0722) (0.0294) (0.0117) (0.1060)
Post-2016 FE Y Y Y Y
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.5643 0.4344 0.3571 0.5563
N 9,545 9,545 9,545 9,545
OLS estimates. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered two-way at the facility and
inspector levels. †Points deducted from scores measured by pre-2017 scoring criteria.
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Table 2: The Effect of Surprise Inspections on Performance: Full Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Critical Major Critical
Variable Violations Violations Violations Deducted Points†
Sole 0.2786*** 0.0932*** 0.0279** 0.4276***
(0.0726) (0.0298) (0.0124) (0.1064)
Post-2016 FE Y Y Y Y
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.5684 0.4440 0.3597 0.5618
N 9,545 9,545 9,545 9,545
OLS estimates. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered two-way at the facility and
inspector levels. †Points deducted from scores measured by pre-2017 scoring criteria.
Table 3: The Effect of Surprise Inspections on Performance: Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Critical Major Critical
Variable Violations Violations Violations Deducted Points†
Sole 0.2650*** 0.1118*** 0.0405** 0.4579***
(0.0938) (0.0429) (0.0169) (0.1455)
Lagged Deducted Points -0.0372 -0.0298 -0.0061 -0.0792
(0.0866) (0.0349) (0.0124) (0.1416)
Post-2016 FE Y Y Y Y
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.5927 0.4778 0.3968 0.5888
N 7,632 7,632 7,632 7,632
OLS estimates. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered two-way at the facility and
inspector levels. †Points deducted from scores measured by pre-2017 scoring criteria.
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